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A CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR EXTENDING 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE TO ASYLUM 
SEEKERS:  REVISITING THE ENTRY FICTION 
AFTER BOUMEDIENE 
Zainab A. Cheema* 
 
In the last two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has actively grappled with 
balancing the interests of immigrant detainees and the federal government 
in the context of prolonged immigration detention by reconciling the 
statutory framework with constitutional guarantees of due process.  The 
Court has focused on how prolonged detention without an opportunity for an 
individualized custody determination poses a serious constitutional threat to 
an alien’s liberty interest.  The Court’s jurisprudence has focused, however, 
on aliens who have effected an entry into the United States.  The 
constitutional entitlements of nonresidents who are detained upon presenting 
themselves at the border have so far been excluded from this new 
immigration narrative and continue to be governed by a more than half-
century-old precedent establishing the “entry fiction” and acceding to the 
plenary power of the Executive. 
This Note focuses on a discrete category of aliens, namely nonresident 
arriving aliens seeking asylum who are detained pursuant to section 235 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  These aliens stand on a different 
legal footing than other categories of aliens detained under the INA because 
they are subject to the entry fiction doctrine, which has manifest 
ramifications for not only their legal status but also the degree of 
constitutional protections they are entitled to.  This Note discusses how 
developments in the extraterritorial application of the Constitution inform 
the entry fiction doctrine in the context of extending procedural protections 
to asylum seekers detained upon entry into the United States. 
This Note shows how the functional approach to extraterritoriality 
articulated in Boumediene v. Bush alters the legal landscape and affords an 
opportunity to extend due process protections to nonresident arriving aliens.  
Cognizant of the limitations imposed by the plenary power doctrine, this Note 
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does not argue for extending the complete panoply of procedural protections 
to section 1225(b) detainees; instead it focuses on how a discrete remedy—
bond hearings—would help alleviate the procedural deficiencies in the 
statutorily prescribed procedure.  In so doing, this Note departs from the 
approach that has currently been adopted by lower courts by positing that 
recent Supreme Court precedent provides a very strong constitutional basis 
for extending procedural protections to section 1225(b) detainees, and it 
would be remiss to rely solely on Clark v. Martinez-inspired constitutional 
avoidance arguments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Eighteen-year-old asylum seeker Lilian Uriba fled her home in El Salvador 
to come to the United States after a drug trafficker killed her father, raped 
her, forced her to transport narcotics, and threatened to kill her six siblings if 
she defected.1  After presenting herself at the border to the authorities, she 
passed the first phase of her asylum case—credible-fear screening —but, as 
of this writing, she remains in indefinite detention at T. Don Hutto 
Residential Center, a 512-bed immigrant detention facility in rural Texas, 
after Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) denied her release.2  
Uriba, like many others in her position, is experiencing the effects of a new 
immigration policy. 
On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order entitled 
“Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvement,” which 
requires immigration personnel to “ensure the detention of aliens 
apprehended for violations of immigration law” and grant parole “only on a 
case-by-case basis.”3  A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
memorandum implementing the executive order gives immigration officials 
wide latitude to target removable aliens.4  Although the memo authorizes 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and ICE personnel to release an 
alien found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture under certain 
limited circumstances,5 ICE has “virtually stopped granting . . . bond or 
 
 1. Meredith Hoffman, Trump Era Ushers in New Unofficial Policy on Asylum-Seekers, 
ROLLING STONE (Apr. 4, 2017, 4:37 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/ 
trump-era-ushers-in-new-unofficial-policy-on-asylum-seekers-w473930 [https://perma.cc/ 
575Q-7MR9]. 
 2. Id.; see also Kate Morrissey, Even Before Trump, Asylum Seeker Already Caught Up 
in Clogged System, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Jan. 20, 2017), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/sd-me-asylum-detention-
20170120-story.html [https://perma.cc/YSD4-ZGJL] (discussing an asylum seeker who fled 
from a terrorist organization in Somalia and who was detained in the U.S. for over a year 
despite passing his credible-fear screening). 
 3. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 3 C.F.R. 263, 265–66 (2017). 
 4. See generally Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Kevin McAleenan et al. (Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter DHS Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-
Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MYS-AX29]; see 
also Jonathan Blitzer, What Will Trump Do with Half a Million Backlogged Immigration 
Cases, NEW YORKER (June 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-
will-trump-do-with-half-a-million-backlogged-immigration-cases [https://perma.cc/NV5E-
54EG] (“So far this year, federal immigration authorities have made forty per cent more arrests 
than they did at an equivalent point in 2016, and the [DHS] has eliminated all the guidelines 
for how [ICE] is supposed to prioritize the people it targets for arrest.”). 
 5. See DHS Memo, supra note 4, at 3 (providing that parole may be granted if said alien 
“affirmatively establishes to the satisfaction of an ICE immigration officer his or her identity, 
that he or she presents neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding, and provided that he or 
she agrees to comply with any additional conditions of release imposed by ICE to ensure 
public safety and appearance at any removal hearings”). 
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parole” to eligible detainees.6  Immigrants like Uriba are legally ineligible to 
appeal ICE’s decision to detain them to an immigration judge.7  Hence, if 
they are denied parole and found to have no right to a bond hearing after a 
reasonable period of time has elapsed, ICE’s new practice of withholding 
parole effectively results in detention for the entire duration of asylum 
proceedings, however long they may last.8  Exacerbating the situation is the 
fact that detention often bears no relation to the merits of a detainee’s 
application or the need for detention.9 
The statutory framework regarding the conditions and procedures of 
immigration detention is set out in the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).10  Whether detention is 
mandatory or discretionary, and whether the Executive has authority to grant 
parole, is carefully circumscribed and depends in large part on the status of 
the alien.11  Asylum seekers like Uriba languish in indefinite civil detention 
with no recourse to procedural protections, such as bond hearings, because 
they are classified as nonresident arriving aliens under IIRIRA.12  Despite 
being detained in civil detention centers in the United States, these asylum 
seekers are treated as if they never effected an entry into U.S. territory, that 
is, they are subject to the “entry fiction” doctrine.13 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on what constitutional protections, 
if any, nonresident arriving aliens like Uriba are entitled to with respect to 
the conditions of their detention and release.  However, since 2000, the Court 
has, on three separate occasions, ruled on the Executive’s authority to detain 
aliens during various stages of removal proceedings.14  These decisions 
address the potential due process violations emanating from prolonged 
detention without recourse to procedural protections—individual custody 
 
 6. See Hoffman, supra note 1.  The DHS Memo worsens already bleak prospects for 
asylum seekers.  Compared to fiscal year 2010, when 15,683 asylum seekers (45 percent of 
all asylum seekers in removal proceedings) were detained, 44,228 asylum seekers 
(representing 77 percent of all asylum seekers in court proceedings) were detained in fiscal 
year 2014. See OLGA BYRNE, ELEANOR ACER & ROBYN BARNARD, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN:  INCREASED U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 2 (2016), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Lifeline-on-Lockdown_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FN3B-Z83E].  Even in the limited situations where parole is granted, ICE 
often sets the bond amount at levels that arriving asylum seekers are unable to pay. See id. at 
4, 25. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.B.3; see also infra note 114. 
 8. See Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 4–5 (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_in_the_unit
ed_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4L9-BHGN]. 
 9. See BYRNE, ACER & BARNARD, supra note 6, at 13.  In many cases, ICE officials fail 
to follow the procedures governing parole decisions and withhold parole even when aliens 
have satisfied the requisite criteria. See id. at 13–19. 
 10. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 42, 48 and 50 U.S.C.). 
 11. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 12. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 13. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.B; see also infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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determinations in particular.15  Although the Court explicitly reserved 
judgment on the constitutionality of indefinitely detaining applicants for 
admission,16 it has hinted at the Executive’s plenary power over the matter.17  
This suggestion, coupled with the territorial application of the Constitution, 
effectively places applicants for admission beyond the reach of procedural 
protections afforded by the Constitution.18 
Lower court decisions dealing with procedural protections for nonresident 
arriving aliens, like Uriba, have focused on whether these aliens are entitled 
to receive bond hearings after a presumptively reasonable period of time.19  
However, following the Supreme Court’s lead, courts that have engaged with 
the question have relied solely on statutory interpretation to reach a decision, 
leaving the entry fiction doctrine intact and the question of constitutional 
entitlements of these nonresident arriving aliens unresolved.20 
While the entry fiction doctrine is deemed to be largely dispositive of what, 
if any, constitutional protections applicants for admission are entitled to, 
developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution cast doubt on its continuing validity.21  In 
Boumediene v. Bush,22 the Supreme Court rejected a rigid adherence to 
notions of territoriality and citizenship in favor of a functional approach and 
held that the Suspension Clause was in “full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”23  
Using the due process framework outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge,24 the 
Court evaluated the sufficiency of review procedures available to 
Guantanamo detainees to determine if they were an adequate substitute to 
habeas relief.25  Although Boumediene was rendered in the context of alien 
detention at Guantanamo and focused on the reach of the Suspension Clause, 
the case’s exposition of the “impracticable and anomalous test” provides the 
building blocks for ascertaining the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution 
in other contexts.26 
This Note adopts Boumediene’s functional approach to show how the Due 
Process Clause may be extended to nonresident arriving aliens.27  
Recognizing that due process is an amorphous standard, this Note uses the 
balancing approach set forth in Eldridge to argue that congressionally 
prescribed procedures for the detention of asylum seekers like Uriba are 
constitutionally insufficient and that the shortfalls may be counteracted by 
 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 16. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 20. See infra notes 151–52, 157–58 and accompanying text. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 22. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 23. Id. at 771; see infra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
 24. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 25. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 202–15 and accompanying text. 
 27. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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simple remedies like bond hearings without running up against the 
Executive’s plenary power.28 
Part I of this Note serves as a brief primer on the history and purposes of 
IIRIRA, how different sections apply to different categories of aliens, and the 
interaction between the statutory scheme and the Constitution.  It outlines 
how the Court has responded to due process concerns arising from prolonged 
detention of aliens subject to removal orders and aliens in detention pending 
removal proceedings.  Part I goes on to discuss the development of the entry 
fiction doctrine, the Executive’s plenary power over immigration matters, 
and how these doctrines affect nonresident arriving aliens.  Part II highlights 
how the entry fiction doctrine has dominated courts’ resolution of the 
problem of extending procedural protections to nonresident arriving aliens.  
Part III posits that the continuing vitality of the entry fiction ought to be 
questioned in light of recent developments in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding extraterritorial application of the Constitution.  
Finally, Part IV shows how Boumediene, the most recent iteration of the 
Court’s jurisprudence on territoriality, may be applied to extend procedural 
protections to nonresident arriving aliens in Uriba’s position, without running 
into plenary power concerns. 
I.  IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Immigration detention has long been employed by the U.S. government to 
enforce immigration policies.29  Unlike criminal detention, immigration 
detention is civil in nature.30  Hence, even though the conditions of 
immigration detention may closely resemble those of criminal detention—or 
may be even worse31—and the private interests at stake may be as substantial, 
immigration detainees only have access to the procedural protections which 
have been prescribed by Congress and not the protections typically afforded 
to criminal defendants.32 
 
 28. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 29. Kevin Johnson, Trump’s Immigration Detention Plan Faces a Long-Established 
Uphill Battle, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2017, 5:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-
immigration-detention-plan-faces-uphill-battle-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/VTL3-ZLUH] 
(noting that immigration detention “goes as far back as the detention of Chinese immigrants 
on Angel Island in San Francisco Bay, which began processing immigrants in the late 1800s”). 
 30. See MICHAEL A. SCAPERLANDA, IMMIGRATION LAW:  A PRIMER 33 (2009) (noting that 
the decision to remove an alien from the United States has long been considered a civil matter). 
 31. See Immigration Detention Conditions, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/ 
immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/immigration-detention-conditions 
[https://perma.cc/6RXP-5JXM] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018); see also CARL TAKEI, MICHAEL 
TAN & JOANNE LIN, ACLU, SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS:  WHY AND HOW THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP USING PRIVATE PRISONS 1–2 (2016), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/white_paper_09-30-
16_released_for_web-v1-opt.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM8Q-QD59]. 
 32. See SCAPERLANDA, supra note 30, at 31–33.  In most instances, it is hard, if not 
impossible, for aliens to benefit from the limited protections afforded to them because of the 
conditions of their detention.  For example, section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act provides that aliens in removal proceedings “shall have the privilege of being represented” 
by counsel provided that the government is not required to pay for it. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).  
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The following discussion focuses on the statutory framework governing 
the treatment and detention of aliens, how the Court has sought to reconcile 
the statutory scheme with constitutional guarantees of due process, and the 
development of the entry fiction doctrine as it pertains to select categories of 
aliens. 
A.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
In 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which created a new framework for 
the classification and detention of aliens.33  Different sections of IIRIRA deal 
with different categories of aliens and prescribe the procedures that executive 
officials must follow with respect to their admission, detention, and 
removal.34  Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), aliens are 
classified as either immigrants or nonimmigrants.35  Lawfully admitted aliens 
who have permission to remain permanently in the United States and who 
may eventually seek citizenship are categorized as immigrants and are more 
popularly known as Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs).36  Aliens who only 
have permission to temporarily stay in the United States, usually for a 
specified purpose, are classified as nonimmigrants.37 
With respect to aliens who do not have permission to reside in the United 
States, either temporarily or permanently, the INA distinguished between 
aliens who have already effected entry into U.S. territory and aliens 
attempting to effect an entry.38  While this distinction is still important, 
IIRIRA replaced the concept of “entry” with the broader concept of 
“admission,” which is defined as “the lawful entry of [an] alien into the 
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”39  
Hence, under IIRIRA, aliens entering without authorization and those denied 
entry at the border are presumptively on the same legal footing, as opposed 
 
However, in practice it is very hard for immigrant detainees to find lawyers willing and able 
to take on their cases. See Importance of Counsel for Asylum Seekers and Immigrants in 
Detention Stressed by Faith, Civil Rights, Legal and Other Leaders, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Apr. 
26, 2013), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/04/26/importance-of-counsel-for-asylum-
seekers-and-immigrants-in-detention-stressed-by-faith-civil-rights-legal-and-other-leaders 
[https://perma.cc/P7HW-NZUT]. 
 33. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 42, 48 and 50 U.S.C.) (amending various sections of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act); see also SCAPERLANDA, supra note 30, at 4 (noting 
IIRIRA’s major impact on immigrants by “expanding the categories of inadmissible and 
deportable aliens, restricting relief from deportation, stream-lining removal and other 
immigration procedures, providing for increased detention of removable aliens, and 
attempting to strip courts of jurisdiction to review numerous immigration matters”). 
 34. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 35. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012); see also id. § 1101(a)(3) (noting that an alien is any 
person who is not a citizen or national of the United States). 
 36. Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 809 (2013). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “Section 1101(a)(13) . . . 
formerly defined ‘entry’ as ‘any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port 
or place’”). 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). 
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to the old regime, which gave preferential treatment to aliens who had 
effected an entry without authorization or inspection.40 
Under the pre-IIRIRA framework, aliens could be denied the “hospitality 
of the United States” either through an exclusion hearing or a deportation 
hearing, depending on whether the alien had effected an entry.41  Aliens 
subject to deportation hearings were entitled to certain procedural 
protections—such as advance notice and the right to appeal directly to a 
federal circuit court—not available to aliens in exclusion proceedings.42  
Under IIRIRA, however, deportation and exclusion hearings were 
consolidated into a single “removal” proceeding,43 which is conducted by an 
immigration judge who determines whether the alien is “removable.”44  In 
the case of an alien not admitted to the United States, removability requires 
a showing of inadmissibility, while in the case of an alien admitted to the 
United States removability means that the alien is deportable.45  The 
conditions for inadmissibility and deportability are set forth in sections 212 
and 241 of IIRIRA, respectively.46  Grounds for inadmissibility include 
health-related concerns, security concerns, criminal convictions, illegal entry 
and immigration violations, and failure to have proper documentation,47 
while grounds for deportability include immigration status violations, 
criminal offenses, and security concerns.48  Further, certain categories of 
inadmissible aliens are subject to expedited removal without a removal 
proceeding.49 
The initiation of removal proceedings or expedited removal proceedings 
is closely tied to immigration detention because aliens subject to either may 
be subject to discretionary or mandatory detention.50  The next section of this 
Note delineates the statutory framework that authorizes immigration 
detention and the constitutional limitations imposed on prolonged detention 
of select categories of aliens.  It further explores how constitutional 
 
 40. See Moore, supra note 36, at 855.  But see infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 41. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) (noting that an alien already present in 
the United States is subject to a deportation hearing, while “the exclusion hearing is the usual 
means of proceeding against an alien outside the United States seeking admission”). 
 42. See id. at 26–27. 
 43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2) (2012) (“An alien placed in proceedings under this section 
may be charged with any applicable ground of inadmissibility under section 1182(a) of this 
title or any applicable ground of deportability under section 1227(a) of this title.”); see also 
8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012) (setting forth procedural requirements for initiating removal 
proceedings). 
 44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). 
 45. Id. § 1229a(e)(2). 
 46. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2012). 
 47. Id. § 1182. 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
 49. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“If an immigration officer determines that an 
alien . . . is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title, the officer 
shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless 
the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.”); see 
infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Moore, supra note 36, at 856–57. 
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entitlements of inadmissible arriving aliens—especially nonresident arriving 
aliens—continue to be closely tied to presence within U.S. territories.51 
B.  Interpreting the Statutory Framework in Light of 
Constitutional Concerns 
Sections 241, 236, and 235 of the INA (as amended by IIRIRA), codified 
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231, 1226, and 1225, respectively, each address different 
categories of aliens in different stages of removal proceedings.  Each of these 
sections authorize or mandate detention but do not expressly limit the length 
of detention.  This statutory ambiguity precipitated concerns about whether 
prolonged detention, in the absence of an opportunity to challenge the factual 
basis of detention, was constitutionally permissible. 
1.  8 U.S.C. § 1231 
Section 1231 focuses on the detention and removal of aliens who are 
subject to a removal order.52  Once an alien has been ordered removed, the 
Attorney General of the United States is required to remove him from the 
country within ninety days.53  This is referred to as the “removal period.”54  
During the removal period, the alien is subject to mandatory detention.55  In 
a limited set of circumstances, the Attorney General has the authority to 
detain an alien beyond the removal period;56  however, the statutory text does 
not limit the length of time the alien may be detained beyond the removal 
period. 
In Zadvydas v. Davis,57 the Supreme Court addressed the due process 
concerns arising from the prospect of aliens being detained indefinitely 
pursuant to § 1231(a)(6).  The Court considered the constitutionality of 
detaining resident aliens, subject to orders of removal, past the removal 
period on account of the government’s inability to remove them.58  In 
determining whether the Attorney General had the authority to detain these 
aliens indefinitely, the Court found that “[a] statute permitting indefinite 
detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem”59 because 
 
 51. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to 
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional 
status changes accordingly.”). 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012). 
 53. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 1231(a)(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the 
alien.  Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an 
alien who has been found inadmissible . . . .”). 
 56. See id. § 1231(a)(6) (“An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 
1182 of this title, removable [on grounds of violating immigration status, criminal convictions, 
or security concerns] or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the 
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the 
removal period . . . .”). 
 57. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 58. See id. at 682. 
 59. Id. at 690. 
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the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the government from 
depriving any person of liberty without due process of law.60  Highlighting 
the nonpunitive nature of civil detention and the need for detention to bear a 
reasonable relation to its purpose, the Court found that the government’s 
proffered justifications for indefinite detention—ensuring the appearance of 
aliens at future immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the 
community—to be lacking.61  In light of the perceived ambiguity of the 
statute and the “serious constitutional threat” posed by indefinite detention 
of aliens who had been admitted to the country,62 the Court interpreted the 
statute to only permit detention that is related to the statute’s “basic purpose 
[of] effectuating an alien’s removal.”63  The Court held that “once removal 
is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer 
authorized by statute.”64  Additionally, the Court decided that detention is 
“presumptively reasonable” for a period of six months following the final 
removal order, after which the alien ought to be provided the opportunity to 
challenge the basis of his detention.65  In so doing, the Court drew a 
distinction between unauthorized detention and the right to “liv[e] at large”:  
even though aliens subject to a removal order have no right to remain in the 
United States unencumbered and unmonitored, they still have a right to be 
free from unreasonable detention.66 
Following Zadvydas, courts were split over whether the procedural 
protections extended in Zadvydas ought to be extended to aliens who had 
never been legally admitted to the United States (i.e., inadmissible aliens 
present in the United States who were subject to removal orders).67  In Clark 
v. Martinez,68 the Court explicitly extended its holding in Zadvydas to 
prohibit indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens—without opportunity for 
 
 60. See id. at 689–90.  Drawing upon case law from the civil commitment context, the 
Court emphasized that government detention violates the Due Process Clause unless ordered 
in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or in certain limited 
circumstances where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, 
outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint. Id. 
at 690. 
 61. See id. at 690–92 (noting that the government’s interest in preventing flight is 
nonexistent where “removal seems a remote possibility” and the alien’s removable status itself 
bears no relation to dangerousness). 
 62. Id. at 699. 
 63. Id. at 697. 
 64. Id. at 699. 
 65. Id. at 701. 
 66. Id. at 696. 
 67. Compare Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that § 1231(a)(6) does 
not draw a “distinction between individuals who are removable on grounds of inadmissibility 
and those removable on grounds of deportability” nor did the Zadvydas Court limit its holding 
to deportable aliens), with Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens does not raise serious constitutional concerns 
and interpreting “Zadvydas as limiting the detention period of only those aliens whose 
continued confinement raises serious constitutional doubt, i.e., resident aliens who have 
effected entry”), rev’d sub nom. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
 68. 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (involving aliens who had arrived in the United States as part of 
the Mariel boatlift). 
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a bond hearing after six months—under § 1231(a)(6).69  Relying solely on 
statutory interpretation, the Court held that a statute’s ambiguous language 
could be given a “limiting construction” based on one of its applications 
“even though other . . . applications, standing alone, would not support the 
same limitation.”70  That is, having decided that constitutional concerns 
arising from the indefinite detention of resident aliens precluded interpreting 
§ 1231(a)(6) from authorizing such detention,71 statutory interpretation 
compelled the same result for inadmissible aliens, even though the statute as 
applied to inadmissible aliens did not give rise to the same constitutional 
concerns.72  Hence, even if the constitutional concerns that had influenced 
the Court’s statutory construction in Zadvydas were absent in the context of 
inadmissible aliens, the same detention provision could not be given a 
different meaning based on the category of aliens it was being applied to.73 
Taken together, § 1231(a)(6), Zadvydas, and Clark v. Martinez afford both 
deportable and inadmissible aliens subject to a removal order and detained 
beyond the removal period the opportunity to review the basis of their 
detention after a presumptively reasonable period of six months. 
2.  8 U.S.C. § 1226 
Section 1226 sets forth the procedures and guidelines governing the 
detention and release of aliens in removal proceedings.74  Under § 1226(a) 
the Attorney General has the authority to detain an arrested alien or release 
her on bond pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed.75  
Section 1226(c) carves out an exception to § 1226(a)’s general immigration 
detention and provides for the mandatory detention of a narrow category of 
criminal noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings.76  An 
alien detained pursuant to § 1226(c) may be released on parole only if she is 
a government witness or is assisting in a major criminal investigation, and if 
the Attorney General is satisfied that she “will not pose a danger to the safety 
of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled 
proceeding.”77 
 
 69. Id. at 378. 
 70. Id. at 380 (“The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.”). 
 71. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380. 
 73. See id. at 380–81. 
 74. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012). 
 75. See id. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be 
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed . . . .”). 
 76. See id. § 1226(c).  Section 1226(c) applies to any alien who is inadmissible or 
deportable by reason of having committed a qualifying offense.  The DHS is allowed to take 
these noncitizen offenders into custody at any time after they are released from criminal 
custody. See Gerard Savaresse, Note, When Is When?:  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and the 
Requirements of Mandatory Detention, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 285, 289 (2013). 
 77. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). 
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In Demore v. Kim,78 the Supreme Court addressed a split among the 
circuits regarding whether mandatory detention of a resident alien, in the 
absence of an individualized determination of the detainee’s dangerousness 
or flight risk, was a violation of due process.79  The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of § 1226(c) against a facial challenge, holding that 
mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens pending removal proceedings 
does not, by itself, offend due process.80  However, the Court based its ruling 
on its understanding that detention prior to removal is for a short, fixed, and 
finite term.81  In his concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy underscored the 
need for individualized hearings when detention becomes unreasonable.82  
According to Justice Kennedy, an LPR detained under § 1226(c) could be 
entitled to an “individualized determination as to his risk of flight and 
dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or 
unjustified.”83 
The Court chiefly distinguished Zadvydas on two grounds.  First, the Court 
noted that the aliens challenging their detention in Zadvydas were ones for 
whom removal was “no longer practically attainable” because detention was 
no longer reasonably related to its purpose of preventing flight.84  However, 
detention of criminal aliens in removal proceedings was found to serve the 
purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing, which 
increased the chances of successful removal upon issuance of a removal 
order.85  Secondly, the Court explained that while the period of detention at 
issue in Zadvydas was “indefinite” and “potentially permanent,” detention 
under § 1226(c) is “of a much shorter duration” and “has an obvious 
termination point.”86 
 
 78. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).  The case involved an LPR, charged with deportability after 
being convicted of first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors, who was being detained 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service pending his removal hearing. See id. at 513. 
 79. Compare Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1226(c) 
was unconstitutional as applied to LPRs on account of the government’s failure to provide a 
“special justification” for no-bail civil detention that would be “sufficient to overcome a lawful 
permanent resident alien’s liberty interest”), rev’d sub nom. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 
(2003), with Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
government’s interest in detention outweighed the petitioner’s liberty interest when he had 
conceded removability and was no longer entitled to remain in the United States). 
 80. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 531 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 531–33. 
 83. Id. at 532. 
 84. See id. at 527 (majority opinion). 
 85. See id. at 528.  The Court also noted that the petitioner had conceded that he was 
deportable and had thereby willingly foregone “a hearing at which he would have been entitled 
to raise any nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not properly included 
in a mandatory detention category.” See id. at 514.  But see id. at 541–42 (Souter, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Court’s suggestion that the petitioner had 
conceded deportability was mistaken). 
 86. See id. at 528–29 (majority opinion).  Relying on statistics provided by the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, the Court noted that “the detention at stake under § 1226(c) 
lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about 
five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” See id. at 529–30. 
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In the years since Demore v. Kim, however, several circuits have construed 
the detention authorized by § 1226(c) to contain an “implicit temporal 
limitation”87 to avoid the serious constitutional concerns that would arise 
from authorizing prolonged detention.  For instance, the Second Circuit in 
Lora v. Shanahan88 established a bright-line rule that “mandatory detention 
for longer than six months without a bond hearing affronts due process” and 
concluded that “an immigrant detained pursuant to section 1226(c) must be 
afforded a bail hearing before an immigration judge within six months of his 
or her detention.”89  The Second Circuit stressed that prolonged detention of 
noncitizens would raise serious constitutional concerns because “freedom 
from imprisonment” lies at the heart of the liberty that the Due Process 
Clause protects.90  The court noted that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 
is permissible, but there must be some procedural safeguard in place for 
immigrants detained for months without a hearing.91 
3.  8 U.S.C. § 1225 
Section 1225 prescribes the immigration procedures for “applicants for 
admission.”92  An applicant for admission is an alien who arrives in the 
United States or an alien who is present in the United States but has not been 
admitted.93  As a practical matter, this category largely includes aliens who 
arrive at the border without valid documentation, such as nonresident 
arriving aliens, and LPRs who are not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled 
to be admitted.”94 
 
 87. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 614 (2d Cir. 2015) (involving the detention of 
an LPR convicted of drug-related offenses), vacated sub nom. Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 
1260 (2018); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that 
Demore v. Kim’s reach is limited to relatively brief periods of detention and holding that 
subclass members detained under § 1226(c) are entitled to a bond hearing after a 
presumptively reasonable period of six months); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 
232 (3d Cir. 2011) (construing Demore v. Kim as recognizing that the constitutionality of 
mandatory detention is a function of the length of the detention).  Even though most circuits 
have construed § 1226(c) to contain an implicit temporal limitation, they have differed over 
whether to establish a presumptively reasonable period at the end of which bond hearings must 
be provided, or adopt a case-by-case approach to determine the reasonableness of detention. 
Compare Lora, 804 F.3d at 614–17 (bright line rule), with Diop, 656 F.3d at 235 (case-by-
case approach).  See generally Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d 
sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 88. 804 F.3d 601. 
 89. Id. at 606, 616. 
 90. Id. at 606. 
 91. Id. at 614. 
 92. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012). 
 93. Id. § 1225 (a)(1). 
 94. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(c) (2012) (requiring that an LPR 
be treated as an applicant for admission if she (1) “has abandoned or relinquished [LPR] 
status,” (2) “has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 
days,” (3) “has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,” (4) “has 
departed from the United States while under legal process seeking removal,” (5) “has 
committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,” or (6) “is attempting to 
enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or has not been 
admitted to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer”). 
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Two classes of applicants for admission are subject to screening for 
expedited removal:  “arriving aliens” and “certain other aliens.”95  An 
arriving alien is “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come 
into the United States at a port-of-entry.”96  “Certain other aliens” are those 
arriving aliens who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States 
and have not been continuously present in the country for the last two years.97 
If an immigration officer determines that an arriving alien or certain other 
alien is inadmissible (e.g., does not possess valid entry documents, has 
presented fraudulent documents, or has made a false claim of U.S. 
citizenship),98 “the officer shall order the alien removed from the United 
States without further hearing or review.”99  A removal order entered in 
accordance with § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) is generally not subject to administrative 
appeal, that is, the decision cannot be appealed to an immigration judge.100  
Judicial review of expedited removal orders is available in habeas corpus 
proceedings, but is limited to determinations of whether the petitioner is an 
alien, whether she was ordered removed pursuant to the authority conferred 
by § 1225(b)(1), and whether she can prove by a preponderance of evidence 
that she is entitled to be admitted to the United States.101  Unless granted 
parole upon a showing of exigent circumstances, an alien subject to expedited 
removal is detained until removed.102 
However, if an alien subject to expedited removal indicates an intention to 
apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, the immigration officer is to refer 
the alien for an interview with an asylum officer.103  The interview is to be 
conducted either at the port of entry or at any other place designated by the 
 
 95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii); 8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (2017). 
 96. 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q) (2017). 
 97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II); see also Designating Aliens for Expedited 
Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004) (authorizing DHS to place in expedited 
removal proceedings any or all members of the following class of aliens:  aliens “who are 
physically present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled,” who are found 
“within 100 air miles of any U.S. international land border,” and who cannot establish that 
they have been physically present in the United States for the immediately preceding fourteen 
days). 
 98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7) (2012). 
 99. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 100. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(C); see also SCAPERLANDA, supra note 30, at 69 (discussing the 
limited jurisdiction of courts to review matters related to expedited removal). 
 101. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (2012); see also id. § 1252(e)(3) (conferring jurisdiction on the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to hear challenges to the constitutionality of 
§ 1225(b)(1)); Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 58–60 (D.D.C. 
1998) (upholding expedited removal provisions against a due process challenge). 
 102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole 
into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-
by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying 
for admission to the United States.”); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.3(b)(2)(iii), 1235.3 (b)(2)(iii) 
(2017). 
 103. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); see also id. § 1225(b)(1)(E) (defining asylum officer as 
an immigration officer who has had “professional training in country conditions, asylum law, 
and interview techniques” and is supervised by a qualified officer who has had substantial 
experience adjudicating asylum applications); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9, 208.30 (2017). 
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Attorney General.104  If the asylum officer determines that an alien has a 
credible fear of persecution,105 the alien “shall be detained for further 
consideration of the application for asylum.”106  Similarly, an LPR returning 
from a trip abroad who is classified as an applicant for admission and is 
unable to show that he is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” 
shall be detained for a removal proceeding.107  In each of these instances, the 
decision of the immigration officer—if favorable to the alien—can be 
challenged before an immigration judge in a removal proceeding.108 
Section 1225(b) neither explicitly limits the length of detention for LPRs 
seeking admission or arriving aliens with a credible fear of persecution, nor 
discusses the availability of bail or an individualized bail hearing; however, 
discretionary parole is available in certain limited circumstances.109  For 
aliens detained under § 1225(b), parole may be granted if the alien is “neither 
a security risk nor a risk of absconding” and (1) has a serious medical 
condition; (2) is pregnant; (3) falls within certain categories of juveniles; 
(4) will be a witness; or (5) if continued detention is otherwise “not in the 
public interest.”110 
For nonresident arriving aliens detained under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), ICE 
policy requires a parole hearing to be provided as soon as practicable 
following a credible-fear determination; each alien’s eligibility for parole is 
to be considered and analyzed on its own merits and based on facts of the 
individual alien’s case.111  If an arriving alien found to have a credible fear 
establishes her identity to the satisfaction of the Detention and Removal 
Office (DRO) and is able to show that she neither presents a flight risk nor a 
danger to the community, ICE policy allows the DRO officer to—absent 
additional factors—parole the alien because her continued detention is not in 
the public interest.112  If parole is denied, an alien may request 
 
 104. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 105. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (defining credible fear of 
persecution as there being a significant possibility that the alien could establish eligibility for 
asylum). 
 106. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).  If, however, an alien is found not to have a credible fear of 
persecution, the alien is ordered removed without further hearing or review. 
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).  Upon the alien’s request, the immigration officer’s determination 
of credible fear may be reviewed by an immigration judge within seven days of the initial 
determination. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). 
 107. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 
 108. Id. § 1225(b)(3). 
 109. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) (2017) (“[A]ny arriving alien 
who appears to the inspecting officer to be inadmissible, and who is placed in removal 
proceedings . . . shall be detained . . . .  Parole of such alien shall only be considered in 
accordance with Section 212.5(b) . . . .”). 
 110. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (2017). 
 111. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DIRECTIVE NO. 11002.1, PAROLE OF ARRIVING 
ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE §§ 6.1–6.2 (2009), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-parole_of_arriving_aliens_found_ 
credible_fear.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV6Y-48Z4]. 
 112. Id. § 6.2.  The decision to grant or deny parole is prepared by the DRO officer and 
must pass through at least one level of supervisory review before being approved by the field 
office. Id. § 6.7. 
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redetermination of this decision based upon changed circumstances or 
additional evidence relevant to her “identity, security risk, or risk of 
absconding.”113  However, immigration judges are precluded from holding 
bond hearings for “[a]rriving aliens in removal proceedings.”114 
C.  The Entry Fiction, Plenary Power, and Procedural Protections 
This Part focuses on the interaction between immigration law and the 
Constitution with reference to the constitutional protections available to 
aliens based on their presence within the United States.  Like other 
noncitizens, inadmissible arriving aliens are entitled to certain substantive 
due process protections.115  The real problem arises in the context of what 
procedural protections, if any, they are entitled to.  This difference is 
attributable in part to the plenary power of the Executive over immigration 
matters and the entry fiction doctrine. 
As early as 1889, the Supreme Court affirmed the plenary power of the 
Executive to exclude foreigners, holding that the “power of exclusion of 
foreigners” was an incident of sovereignty and executive determinations of 
exclusion and admission were “conclusive upon the judiciary.”116  Hence, it 
was deemed to be beyond the province of the judiciary to oppose immigration 
decisions made by the legislative and executive branches regarding 
foreigners who had neither been naturalized in, domiciled in, resided in, nor 
gained lawful admission into the United States; notably, the Court held that 
“[a]s to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, 
acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of 
law.”117 
 
 113. Id. § 6.5. 
 114. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2017); see Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 
1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because parole decisions under § 1182 are purely discretionary, they 
cannot be appealed to [immigration judges] or courts.  This lack of review has proven 
especially problematic when immigration officers have denied parole based on blatant 
errors.”), rev’d sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 115. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (holding unconstitutional 
a statute that imposed a year of hard labor upon aliens subject to a final deportation order and 
noting that “to declare unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous crime, 
punishable by deprivation of liberty and property, would be to pass out of the sphere of 
constitutional legislation, unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be 
established by a judicial trial”); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 974 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the entry fiction does not necessarily preclude a nonadmitted alien from 
“coming within the ambit of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause”); 
Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Even an excludable alien is a ‘person’ for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment and is thus entitled to substantive due process.”); see also 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:  Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (1992) (noting the contrast 
between the stunted growth of constitutional immigration law and the “flowering of 
constitutional protections for aliens” in other areas). 
 116. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606–
09 (1889) (involving the exclusion of a Chinese laborer held on a ship in the San Francisco 
Bay). 
 117. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).  The reach of the Executive’s plenary 
power was eventually extended beyond orders of exclusion to deportation orders entered 
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However, in Yamataya v. Fisher118 the Court announced an important 
limitation to the Executive’s plenary power, holding that aliens inside the 
United States were entitled to greater constitutional safeguards than aliens 
seeking admission, and the procedures used to make immigration decisions 
were subject to the Due Process Clause and, hence, independent evaluation 
by the courts.119  In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court built 
upon the territorial distinction introduced in Yamataya to limit the grant of 
procedural due process protections to deportable aliens, that is, aliens who 
were already physically present in the United States.120  However, excludable 
aliens—including nonresident arriving aliens—remained beyond the reach 
of these constitutional protections because admission into the United States 
was a privilege granted by the sovereign, which could only be exercised in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed by the government.121 
Judicial deference to the Executive’s power over immigration matters and 
adherence to the territorial underpinning of constitutional entitlements of 
immigrant detainees reached its apex in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei.122  Mezei was an LPR who traveled behind the Iron Curtain at the 
height of the Cold War and was ordered permanently excluded upon 
return.123  The decision to exclude was made by the Attorney General on the 
basis of national security concerns, and Mezei was afforded no opportunity 
for a hearing before a neutral decision maker.124  Following the government’s 
successive failures to affect Mezei’s departure from Ellis Island, Mezei 
sought relief from his allegedly unlawful confinement through habeas 
proceedings.125  However, the Supreme Court held that, unlike “aliens who 
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, [and] may be expelled 
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness 
 
against resident aliens already in the United States. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 731 (1892) (rejecting a due process challenge brought by Chinese immigrants 
working in the United States); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of 
Plenary Power:  Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 
545, 550–53 (1990). 
 118. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 119. See id. at 100–01; David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional 
Protection for Aliens:  The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 53–
54; Motomura, supra note 117, at 553–55 (noting that the harshest aspects of the plenary 
power doctrine were ameliorated by requiring some level of due process in deportation 
proceedings); The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 287–88 (2003) 
(noting that the Court has limited the plenary power doctrine to substantive criteria for 
admission and expulsion). 
 120. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 545–47 (1950) 
(rejecting procedural challenge brought by a war bride regarding the Executive’s decision to 
exclude her without a hearing); see also Martin, supra note 119, at 54–56. 
 121. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. 
 122. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 123. Id. at 208.  Even though Mezei was an LPR, the Court held that his protracted absence 
marked a clear break in his continuous residence and he stood on the same legal footing as an 
entrant alien. See id. at 214.  However, the Court acknowledged that under some circumstances 
temporary absence from the United States cannot deprive an LPR of his constitutional right to 
due process. See id. at 213. 
 124. Id. at 212–13. 
 125. Id. at 208–09. 
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encompassed in due process of law,” aliens like Mezei who stand on the 
threshold of entry are only entitled to the procedural protections granted by 
Congress.126  The Court clarified that Mezei’s harborage at Ellis Island was 
an act of legislative grace and neither constituted an entry nor affected his 
legal rights for purposes of immigration law.127  In sum, the Court not only 
upheld the indefinite detention of an excludable alien but also withheld any 
constitutional entitlement to due process protections for excludable aliens.128  
In the years since, Mezei has come to be seen as establishing the entry fiction:  
aliens seeking admission into the United States may physically be allowed 
within its borders pending a determination of admissibility, but they are 
legally considered to be detained at the border and hence enjoy limited 
protections under the Constitution.129 
With the passage of IIRIRA and consolidation of exclusion within the 
broader concept of admission, the entry fiction has manifest ramifications for 
the constitutional entitlements of nonresident arriving aliens.  The next Part 
explores how presence within the United States has become the hallmark of 
due process within the immigration framework and how the entry fiction has 
precluded courts from considering the procedural protections available to 
nonresident arriving aliens. 
II.  THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE ENTRY FICTION 
IN IMMIGRATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Despite the passage of IIRIRA, which sought to place inadmissible aliens 
within and without the United States on the same legal footing, the entry 
fiction doctrine continues to occupy an increasingly significant role in 
immigration law jurisprudence.  Even though Mezei’s impact on the 
constitutional entitlement of LPRs who may be treated as applicants for 
admission was circumscribed,130 it continues to hold unabated force as far as 
nonresident arriving aliens are concerned. 
In Landon v. Plasencia,131 the Supreme Court held that an LPR who is 
only briefly absent from the United States is entitled to the same due process 
 
 126. Id. at 212; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the 
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 10 (1990) (noting that Congress acts essentially free from 
any constitutional limits when it establishes admission and detention procedures at the border). 
 127. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213. 
 128. Professor Motomura notes that during the 1950s the Supreme Court expressed a 
readiness to recite an abstract procedural due process requirement but a reluctance to apply it 
for an alien’s benefit in the context of immigration detention. See Motomura, supra note 115, 
at 1643–44. 
 129. Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded by 
statute, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, as recognized in Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 
2002); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012) (noting that the discretionary parole of an 
alien shall not be regarded as admission). 
 130. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1143 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the 
impetus for providing bail hearings to LPRs detained under § 1225(b) is greater than that for 
affording bail hearings to aliens detained under § 1226(c)). 
 131. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
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protections as a continuously present resident alien.132  However, the Court 
held that the precise contours of the due process the petitioner was entitled to 
was a question of balancing the competing private and government interests 
at stake.133  In so doing, the Court adopted the test it outlined in Mathews v. 
Eldridge,134 which balances three factors in determining the level of 
protection due:  (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of said interest and the value of additional safeguards; and (3) the 
government’s interest.135 
In contrast, as recently as its 2001 holding in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that the “distinction between an alien who has effected an entry 
into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout 
immigration law,” such that “certain constitutional protections available to 
persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our 
geographic borders.”136  Hence, even though IIRIRA intended to place aliens 
having effected an illegal entry into the United States on the same legal 
footing as aliens seeking admission at the border, it remains unclear whether 
that is actually the case.137  Given the unique position nonresident arriving 
aliens occupy in the constitutional landscape, the next section of this Note 
looks at how courts have approached the question of whether nonresident 
arriving aliens are entitled to any procedural protections with respect to their 
detention. 
 
 132. See id. at 32–34.  In distinguishing Mezei, the Court drew a distinction between an 
LPR only briefly absent from the United States who can assert due process rights and an LPR 
who may lose his constitutional entitlements because of extended absence from the U.S. Id. at 
33–34. 
 133. Id. at 34. 
 134. 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (holding that, in order to comport with due process, the 
procedures at issue should be tailored to “‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are 
to be heard’ to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970))). 
 135. Id. at 334–35. 
 136. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).  The majority affirmatively concluded 
that rejection of Mezei’s procedural challenge had rested upon a “basic territorial distinction.” 
See id. at 694. 
 137. See Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 321 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is well established that 
even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to 
the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”); see also Moore, 
supra note 36, at 855–56.  In In re X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (B.I.A. 2005), the Board of 
Immigration Appeals held that an alien who is initially screened for expedited removal under 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A), but is subsequently placed in removal proceedings following a 
positive credible-fear determination, is eligible for a custody redetermination hearing before 
an immigration judge.  Aliens found eligible for a custody redetermination before an 
immigration judge in In re X-K- and arriving aliens detained under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) only 
differ in one respect:  the former enter the United States without inspection, while the latter 
present themselves at the border. See Martin, supra note 119, at 97–99. 
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A.  Treatment by Lower Courts 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez,138 lower 
courts were split over whether § 1225(b) detainees are entitled to the 
procedural protection of bond hearings.  The split was most pronounced in 
the Southern District of New York.139  Of the courts to have addressed the 
issue, none have addressed the question of whether nonresident arriving 
aliens have any constitutional entitlement to procedural protections, such that 
subjecting them to prolonged detention would raise serious constitutional 
problems.  Instead, as delineated below, the courts have chosen to rely on a 
statutory interpretation approach inspired by Clark v. Martinez. 
1.  The Southern District of New York: 
Arias v. Aviles and Saleem v. Shanahan 
In Arias v. Aviles,140 the court had to decide what constitutional protections 
are available to LPRs designated as applicants for admission.141  Arias, an 
LPR who had briefly left the United States, was taken into custody upon his 
return at John F. Kennedy Airport when federal law enforcement officials 
found cocaine in his luggage.142  Arias pled guilty to criminal possession of 
a controlled substance and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year.143  
After completing his sentence, he was transferred back to DHS custody and 
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).144 
Arias argued that as an LPR he was entitled to due process protections and 
that “the Lora court’s constitutional avoidance analysis applies equally to the 
mandatory detention provision in § 1225(b) as it did to § 1226(c).”145  The 
government argued that Arias, as an arriving alien, did “not have the same 
due process protections as aliens who have been admitted” and the court 
 
 138. 138 S. Ct. 830, 842–48, 851 (2018) (holding that aliens detained under sections 
1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) have no statutory right to periodic bond hearings during the 
course of their detention, but remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit to “consider respondents’ 
constitutional arguments on their merits”). 
 139. Compare Ricketts v. Simonse, No. 16 Civ. 6662, 2016 WL 7335675, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 16, 2016) (holding that, “post-Lora, detention pursuant to § 1225(b) must be construed 
to contain a reasonableness limitation of six months”), Saleem v. Shanahan, No. 16-CV-808, 
2016 WL 4435246, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 22, 2016) (declining “to interpret 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) differently depending on which litigant is before it, the Court construe[d] the 
provision to include a reasonable temporal limitation of sixth months on [nonresident arriving 
alien’s] detention”), appeal filed, No. 16-3587 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016), and Arias v. Aviles, 
No. 15-CV-9249, 2016 WL 3906738, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2016) (finding that § 1225(b) 
“must be construed to avoid due process concerns” and “that a six-month limit as outlined in 
Lora is the appropriate limiting principle in this circuit”), with Perez v. Aviles, 188 F. Supp. 
3d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that detention under § 1225(b) is neither “implicitly 
time limited [n]or requires a bond hearing”), and Cardona v. Nalls-Castillo, 177 F. Supp. 3d 
815, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (declining to extend Lora to § 1225(b)). 
 140. No. 15-CV-9249, 2016 WL 3906738 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2016). 
 141. Id. at *1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at *2. 
 145. Id. at *4. 
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should defer to Congress’s statutory scheme that “lessens any possible due 
process concerns.”146  Relying on Plasencia, the court held that “LPRs 
like . . . Arias possess the same rights at the border as they do inside it, in 
spite of their brief absence from the United States.”147  Having determined 
that Arias was entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause, the court 
saw no basis to distinguish the constitutional protections claimed by Arias 
and those afforded to the petitioner in Lora, and it read § 1225(b) to include 
a reasonable limit on the length of detention before a bond hearing was 
needed to avoid serious constitutional concerns.148  The import of the Arias 
decision lies in how the constitutional protections afforded to LPRs detained 
under § 1225(b) were subsequently extended to nonresident arriving aliens. 
In Saleem v. Shanahan,149 the court had to decide whether the petitioner, 
a nonresident arriving alien seeking asylum, was entitled to a bond 
hearing.150  The court relied on Clark v. Martinez to hold that, having 
construed § 1225(b) to avoid infringing upon the due process rights of certain 
LPRs in Arias, it must interpret the provision consistently for all aliens 
detained pursuant to § 1225(b) “irrespective of whether or not those 
constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the Court.”151  
Significantly, the court refused to engage in delineating the constitutional 
entitlement of petitioner to due process protection with respect to his status 
but noted that “the extent of his due process rights remains unclear in light 
of his nonresident alien status.”152 
2.  The Ninth Circuit:  Rodriguez v. Robbins 
Among the circuit courts, the Ninth Circuit is the only one that has 
addressed the issue of whether “the prolonged detention of ‘applicants for 
admission’ under Section 1225(b) raises the same ‘serious constitutional 
concerns’ that are implicated by prolonged detention of other detained 
aliens.”153  The case involved a certified class of noncitizens (the § 1226(c) 
subclass and the § 1225(b) subclass) who challenged their prolonged 
detention on account of not having been given an individualized custody 
determination to justify continued detention.154  The § 1225(b) subclass was 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at *8. 
 148. Id. at *8–10 (noting that a decision allowing indefinite detention of LPRs under 
§ 1225(b) “could result in affording more protections to nonresident aliens detained under 
§ 1226(c), and for whom removal is authorized by law, than to LPRs detained pursuant to 
§ 1225(b) [who are] merely accused of wrongdoing”). 
 149. No. 16-CV-808, 2016 WL 4435246 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 22, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-
3587 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016). 
 150. Id. at *1. 
 151. Id. at *4. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Rodriguez v. 
Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 
(2018). 
 154. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1130–31. 
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comprised of LPRs returning from abroad as well as nonresident arriving 
aliens (i.e., applicants for admission subject to the entry fiction doctrine).155 
The Ninth Circuit noted that even though most of the members of the 
§ 1225(b) subclass fell into the category of aliens described in Mezei as 
entitled to limited due process protections, applying § 1225(b) to authorize 
prolonged detention of LPRs within the same class would raise serious 
constitutional concerns.156  Since the § 1225(b) subclass included “at least 
some aliens who [were] not subject to the entry fiction doctrine,” the court 
relied on Clark v. Martinez to construe the statute with these aliens in mind 
and extended the right to an individual bond hearing at the six-month mark 
to the entire subclass.157  Significantly, the court’s analysis of the 
constitutional entitlements of nonresident arriving aliens as a group unto 
themselves was limited to the recognition that its earlier decisions holding 
that excludable aliens—who were subject to the entry fiction—had no 
substantive right to be free from immigration detention were still good 
law.158 
B.  Procedural Protections and a Constitutional Theory of Immigration 
The jurisprudence of immigration detention is heavily reliant on statutory 
interpretation, be it the courts’ adherence to the canon of constitutional 
avoidance or the innovation of the least-common-denominator approach.159  
Acknowledging Congress’s plenary power over matters of immigration 
policy, courts have been reluctant to grant aliens constitutional procedural 
protections.160  However, this is not to say that this plenary power is not 
subject to constitutional limitations.  Courts have frequently addressed 
possible constitutional difficulties that may arise from prolonged detention 
of aliens without recourse to procedural protections.161 
This Note does not purport to address the merits of a constitutionalized 
theory of immigration detention as opposed to a statutory theory; rather, it 
seeks to show how the gap within immigration jurisprudence resulting from 
judicial recalcitrance to address the constitutional entitlement of nonresident 
arriving aliens to certain procedural protections may be filled by recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence related to extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution.162  Given the Court’s decision in Jennings, the time is ripe for 
lower courts to consider the constitutionality of prolonged immigration 
detention.163 
 
 155. Id. at 1140–42. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1142–44; see also supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1141; cf. supra note 138. 
 159. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 160. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 161. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 162. See discussion infra Parts III.B., IV. 
 163. See Kevin Johnson, Opinion Analysis:  Court Tees Up Issue of the Constitutionality 
of Indefinite Immigration Detention for the 9th Circuit, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2018, 8:44 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/02/opinion-analysis-court-tees-issue-constitutionality 
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Although courts have increasingly emphasized the distinction between an 
alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never 
entered, the implications of this distinction have largely been dealt with either 
in a cursory way or not at all.164  This treatment, or lack thereof, is 
problematic on two counts.  First, even though statutory ambiguity may yield 
temporary protection for nonresident arriving aliens, they are increasingly 
vulnerable to changes in executive or legislative policy.165  The Clark v. 
Martinez Court explicitly avoided extending constitutional protections to 
inadmissible aliens, relying solely on statutory interpretation.166  
Furthermore, the Court hinted that it was within Congress’s power to revise 
the statute to allow indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens.167  This 
vulnerability becomes even more pronounced when a decision like Clark v. 
Martinez, which dealt with inadmissible aliens, is compared with Zadvydas, 
which dealt with aliens present within the United States.  Unlike Clark v. 
Martinez, which has been interpreted as setting down a rule of statutory 
interpretation, Zadvydas—although decided on grounds of constitutional 
avoidance—has come to be seen as establishing the constitutional 
requirements with respect to aliens detained pursuant to § 1231.168  
Constitutional due process has developed as a dialogue between courts and 
the other branches of government, such that courts have persuaded 
legislatures to add important procedural protections to protect liberty 
interests to keep up with evolving notions of fundamental fairness.169  So, 
when courts declare that they have no role to play in the process—as in the 
case of nonresident arriving aliens—this dialogue is seriously 
undermined.170 
Second, and more importantly, relying solely on Clark v. Martinez’s 
lowest-common-denominator approach promulgates the notion that standing 
as a class unto themselves, nonresident arriving aliens are bereft of 
procedural protections.  This Note primarily seeks to show how 
developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the extraterritorial 
 
-indefinite-immigration-detention-9th-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/55G3-4RBT] (noting that by 
remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit, the Court has tasked the Ninth Circuit with deciding 
“whether indefinite detention of noncitizens without a bond hearing as authorized by the 
immigration statute[s] is constitutional”); see also Leah Litman, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
Immigration Sins of the Past, and the Forced Separation of Families, TAKE CARE (June 6, 
2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/jennings-v-rodriguez-immigration-sins-of-the-past-
and-the-forced-separation-of-families [https://perma.cc/B5T4-EA7X] (“The Court did not . . . 
address whether the statutes, by allowing indefinite detentions with no individualized bond 
hearings, are consistent with the due process clause.”). 
 164. See discussion supra Parts I.C., II.A. 
 165. See José Javier Rodríguez, Clark v. Martinez:  Limited Statutory Construction 
Required by Constitutional Avoidance Offers Fragile Protection for Inadmissible Immigrants 
from Indefinite Detention, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 505, 506 (2005). 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id.; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005). 
 168. See Martin, supra note 119, at 79. 
 169. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and “Community Ties”:  A 
Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 258 (1983). 
 170. See id. at 258–59. 
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application of the Constitution undermine the latter proposition and provide 
an arguably stronger foundation to ground procedural protections for 
nonresident arriving aliens. 
III.  TERRITORIALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION:  FROM STRICT FORMALISM 
TO PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONALISM 
The geographic scope of the Constitution has been hotly contested since 
the late eighteenth century.171  At its core, territoriality posits that 
government action outside the borders of the nation is not constrained by 
constitutional limitations.172  This Part explores how the Supreme Court has 
approached the question of extraterritorial application of the Constitution by 
focusing on three seminal cases, which involve questions of citizenship as 
well as extraterritoriality.  It goes on to discuss how the most recent iteration 
of extraterritoriality could fill the gap in immigration law jurisprudence 
created by the entry fiction doctrine and bring nonresident arriving aliens 
within the fold of the Constitution’s protection. 
A.  Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez:  A Lesson in Formalism 
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,173 a group of twenty-one German nationals 
convicted of war crimes and imprisoned in occupied Germany sought review 
of their detention via habeas corpus.  The Supreme Court denied the 
requested relief and explained that it is an “alien’s presence within [U.S.] 
territorial jurisdiction” that creates constitutional protection and that there is 
“no authority whatever for holding that the Fifth Amendment confers rights 
upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and 
whatever their offenses.”174  The Court held that it would be paradoxical to 
grant constitutional rights to these detainees because they were enemy aliens, 
had never been in or resided in the United States, and had been captured 
outside the United States.175 
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,176 the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to searches and seizures that occurred in Mexico, 
even though the searches would have violated the Fourth Amendment if 
committed within the United States.177  The Court noted that even if a 
 
 171. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 910–12 (1991). 
 172. See id. at 915. 
 173. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 174. See id. at 771, 783. 
 175. See id. at 777–78, 784. 
 176. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 177. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had affirmed the district court’s holding 
that the Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the federal government, even when it 
operates abroad, and that the nonresident respondent was entitled to constitutional protections. 
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990).  However, the dissenting judge on the panel, relying on United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), argued that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed 
in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of [U.S.] citizens.” 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional violation had occurred, it had occurred outside the United 
States and thus the plaintiff could not claim the protections of the 
Constitution.178  The Court’s holding was premised on complementary 
considerations of territoriality and citizenship.179  The majority interpreted 
Eisentrager’s holding to “emphatic[ally]” reject the “claim that aliens are 
entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the 
United States.”180  The Court noted that even though aliens enjoy limited 
constitutional protections, these protections are dependent on the aliens’ 
presence within U.S. territory and substantial connections with the 
country.181 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, however, while acknowledging that the 
Constitution does not apply to “some undefined, limitless class of 
noncitizens . . . beyond [U.S.] territory,”182 articulated a different test for the 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution.183  According to Justice 
Kennedy, the citizenship of the person claiming the constitutional protection 
and his presence or absence within the U.S. at the time of the alleged 
violation were relevant considerations, but not dispositive of the inquiry; he 
opined that the focus of the inquiry ought to be whether adherence to 
constitutional guarantees would be impracticable and anomalous under the 
circumstances.184 
B.  Boumediene and the Emergence of the 
“Impracticable and Anomalous” Test 
In Boumediene v. Bush,185 the Supreme Court was asked to settle whether 
protections of habeas corpus could be extended to alien detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.186  The Court held that the Suspension Clause of the 
Constitution187 “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”188  The Court 
concluded that foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo had a constitutional 
right to challenge the factual basis for their detention.189  The Court ruled 
that provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act, which provides individuals 
with a military hearing before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) 
 
 178. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264–68. 
 179. See Moore, supra note 36, at 835–36. 
 180. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269. 
 181. See id. at 271.  Justice William Rehnquist drew a distinction between the text of the 
Fourth Amendment, which refers to “the people,” and the Fifth Amendment, which refers to 
any “person,” and suggested that “the people” was used as a term of art to refer to “a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” Id. at 264–66. 
 182. See id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 183. See Neuman, supra note 171, at 965–70. 
 184. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Neuman, 
supra note 171, at 974. 
 185. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 186. See id. at 739. 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”). 
 188. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
 189. See id. at 783–84. 
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and limited judicial review in the D.C. Circuit, did not provide the prisoners 
with an adequate opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their detention 
and was an inadequate substitute for the writ of habeas corpus.190 
The Court held that the writ of habeas extends despite detainees’ 
noncitizen status and their presence outside domestic borders.191  In so doing, 
the Court rejected a strict non-extraterritorial test and articulated a functional 
approach to determine the Constitution’s geographical reach:  “whether a 
constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect depends upon the 
‘particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible 
alternatives which Congress had before it’ and . . . whether judicial 
enforcement of the provision would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’”192  
In line with his concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy—now 
writing for the majority—noted that practical considerations bearing on the 
reach of the Constitution relate not only to citizenship, but also to the place 
of confinement and the sufficiency of process provided.193 
Even though the Guantanamo detainees were not American citizens, their 
status as enemy combatants was contested and the alien detainees’ only 
recourse to challenging their status was through CSRTs.194  The Court found 
the lack of procedural protections afforded in CSRT hearings—lack of 
counsel and limited ability to rebut government evidence—particularly 
troubling.195  Moreover, unlike the alien prisoners in Eisentrager, who were 
detained in foreign territory, these aliens were detained at Guantanamo, 
which was “within the constant jurisdiction of the United States.”196 
In delineating the reach of the Constitution, the Court clarified that 
“[n]othing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever been the 
only relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the 
Constitution” and emphasized that “questions of extraterritoriality turn on 
objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”197  The Court 
explained that Eisentrager was influenced as much by practical 
considerations as it was by notions of de jure sovereignty:  the costs of 
producing alien prisoners being detained at Landsberg Prison in Germany 
would have presented significant difficulties for the government, damaged 
the prestige of the military at a sensitive time, and interfered with military 
efforts to contain enemy elements in postwar Germany.198 
In contrast, the Guantanamo detainees were being kept at a “secure prison 
facility located on an isolated and heavily fortified military base,”199 and 
 
 190. See id. at 783–90. 
 191. See id. at 766–69. 
 192. Id. at 759 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 193. See id. at 760; see also Richard Nicholson, Note, Functionalism’s Military Necessity 
Problem:  Extraterritorial Habeas Corpus, Justice Kennedy, Boumediene v. Bush, and Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1393, 1425 (2012). 
 194. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
 195. See id. at 767. 
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 197. Id. at 764. 
 198. See id. at 762. 
 199. Id. at 770. 
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there was no indication that adjudicating a habeas petition would cause 
friction with an international government or compromise the military mission 
at Guantanamo.200  Although extending the reach of the Suspension Clause 
would inevitably require expenditure of funds by the government, the Court 
did not find these costs to be dispositive as “[c]ompliance with any judicial 
process requires some incremental expenditure of resources.”201 
Hence, even though it did not overrule any of the Court’s previous cases, 
Boumediene signified a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence from strict 
formalism to pragmatism with respect to extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution.202  Casting Eisentrager in the mold of pragmatism, as the 
Boumediene Court did, paves the way for ascertaining whether the Due 
Process Clause can be extended to aliens beyond the territory of the United 
States.203  As a matter of doctrine, Boumediene was decided on Suspension 
Clause grounds204 and does not address whether the Constitution’s other 
provisions—due process in particular—extend beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.  This issue has fallen largely to the D.C. 
Circuit to resolve; while several opinions have intimated that alien detainees 
lack any constitutional rights beyond the Suspension Clause, no such rule has 
been conclusively adopted. 
In Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I),205 the D.C. Circuit had to decide 
whether Uighur detainees being held at Guantanamo, whose enemy 
combatant status had been removed, could seek federal habeas relief in the 
form of entry and release inside the United States.206  Although the thrust of 
the holding came from Congress’s plenary power over decisions of 
admission, the court noted that the Due Process Clause would offer scant 
protection to petitioners.207  Since Kiyemba III,208 the D.C. Circuit has yet to 
resolve whether its initial pronouncement in Kiyemba I—that alien detainees 
had no constitutional rights—remains good law.209 
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There is a wealth of scholarship on the various interpretations of the 
Boumediene decision and its implications for an extraterritorial 
Constitution;210 it is beyond the scope of this Note to delve into a thorough 
exposition of each of these theories.  This Note adopts Boumediene’s 
functional approach outlined above to determine how, and to what extent, the 
Due Process Clause may be applied extraterritorially to nonresident arriving 
aliens. 
IV.  BOUMEDIENE AND THE FUTURE OF THE ENTRY FICTION 
The hurdle to extending due process protection to arriving aliens who are 
treated as never having effected entry into the United States is the idea that 
legal circumstances change once an alien enters the country.  “[F]or the Due 
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 
aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 
permanent.”211  Given that the entry fiction doctrine places aliens who were 
never formally admitted outside the territory of the United States and hence 
beyond the reach of the Due Process Clause,212 the functional approach can 
be applied to “extend” constitutional protections to unadmitted aliens 
detained within the United States. 
Although the Guantanamo detainees are on a different legal footing than 
nonadmitted aliens,213 their legal similarities—citizenship and location—are 
significant.  Moreover, the differences among them support extending the 
Due Process Clause to inadmissible aliens.  If the Court was willing to extend 
due process protections—in the guise of the Suspension Clause—to potential 
enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, it is difficult to see why similar 
protections should not be afforded to aliens whose only infraction is a lack 
of proper entry documents and who have major private interests at stake.214  
Significantly, it would not be “impracticable or anomalous” to extend 
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procedural protections to nonresident arriving aliens.  “Practical 
considerations” shaping the reach of the Constitution weigh heavily in favor 
of extending procedural due process protections:  the inspection stations for 
U.S. ports of entry are clearly on U.S. territory, the ongoing detention of 
arriving aliens occurs at U.S. jails or prisons within the interior, and 
producing them for bond hearings neither damages the prestige of 
immigration authorities nor imposes a heavy burden on government 
resources.215  The following discussion focuses on how the practical 
considerations central to the Boumediene Court’s disposition counsel in favor 
of extending the reach of the Due Process Clause to asylum seekers.216 
A.  Functionalism and the Demise of the Entry Fiction 
Boumediene’s focus on practical factors in determining the reach of the 
Constitution is arguably a death knell for the entry fiction.  If the reach of the 
Due Process Clause is shaped by practical considerations, as discussed 
below, then the entry fiction’s archaic emphasis on physical presence loses 
its value.  The following discussion explores how the Boumediene functional 
approach bolsters the extension of the Due Process Clause to nonresident 
arriving aliens. 
1.  Citizenship and Status of the Detainee and Adequacy 
of the Determination Process 
Asylum seekers, like the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene, are not 
citizens of the United States.217  The designation of asylum seekers as 
nonresident arriving aliens is statutorily prescribed, but status determinations 
of whether a nonresident arriving alien seeking asylum has demonstrated a 
credible fear of persecution and whether she is to be granted parole are made 
by executive officials.218  Even though a DRO’s decision to grant or deny 
parole is subject to at least one level of supervisory review, the review is also 
conducted by executive officials.219  Requests for redetermination are heard 
by executive officials and the field office has the discretion to either re-
interview the alien or consider the request solely based on documentary 
material already provided.220  Detention authorized by executive officials 
without the possibility of review before a neutral decision maker hardly 
qualifies as adequate process.221 
Moreover, the ability of these alien detainees to gather evidence and 
present their case for parole is severely constrained on account of their 
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detention and lack of access to counsel.222  Despite having a statutorily 
granted privilege of access to counsel, less than 14 percent of all aliens in 
detention manage to secure legal representation.223  Given the fact that these 
asylum seekers have little or no familiarity with the U.S. legal system and 
are often still suffering from the effects of trauma and persecution, their 
ability to gather evidence and effectively represent themselves in the 
redetermination process is severely impeded.224  Hence, not only is the parole 
determination process completely shielded from review by a neutral decision 
maker, it also places severe constraints on an asylum seeker’s ability to have 
a meaningful opportunity for a hearing.225  The similarity between the parole 
process for asylum seekers and the procedurally deficient CSRT hearings in 
Boumediene226 counsels in favor of extending the reach of the Due Process 
Clause to detained asylum seekers. 
2.  Nature of Sites Where Apprehension and Detention Took Place 
Comparably to the Guantanamo detainees, the asylum seekers who are the 
focus of this Note are apprehended at the border—outside the United 
States.227  However, unlike the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene who 
were held in an area over which the United States exerts only de facto 
sovereignty and control,228 asylum seekers are detained at detention facilities 
in U.S. territory,229 over which the United States inarguably exerts de facto 
and de jure sovereignty and control.  This favors using the functional 
approach to apply the Due Process Clause to these aliens.  The mere fact of 
being detained on U.S. soil does not entitle asylum seekers to constitutional 
protections.230  However, the location of detention does favor extending the 
reach of the Due Process Clause, as doing so is unlikely to raise practical 
anomalies, such as those encountered in Eisentrager, where aliens seeking 
procedural protections were being detained in another country.231 
3.  Inherent Practical Obstacles 
Boumediene was animated by concerns about costs and international 
comity that would attach upon extending the Suspension Clause to reach 
Guantanamo detainees.232  With respect to asylum seekers, there is no 
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concern that extending due process would invoke friction with other nations; 
in fact, quite to the contrary, denial of procedural protections stands in stark 
contrast to the United States’s obligations under international conventions 
for the protection of asylum seekers and refugees.233 
Although extending the Due Process Clause to asylum seekers might 
require government expenditure, Boumediene is instructive.234  Reasonable 
costs incurred in complying with requirements of judicial process should not 
be used as a sword to ward off executive responsibility.235  Moreover, the 
exact magnitude of costs incurred would depend on the degree and measure 
of procedural protections extended under the Due Process Clause.236 
Thus, on balance, practical considerations tip the scale in favor of 
extending the Due Process Clause to applicants for admission.  The 
discussion above, although dealing with asylum seekers, could arguably be 
applied to applicants for admission subject to expedited removal.  If this were 
the case, it would hamper the enforcement of immigration policies by 
interposing the judiciary in the Executive’s way at every step.237  However, 
that is not the case.  Recognizing that the Due Process Clause applies to 
asylum seekers—or applicants for admission—is only the first step.  The 
content of due process protections would inevitably depend on balancing the 
purpose and government interest in detention against the private interests at 
stake,238 which would not only delimit the protections available to asylum 
seekers in a manner reconcilable with the plenary power doctrine, but also 
exclude applicants for admission subject to expedited removal from the 
purview of enhanced procedural protections.  As in Plasencia, the question 
of whether an alien is entitled to invoke the protection of the Due Process 
Clause is different from what specific process she is entitled to and whether 
the procedure prescribed by Congress is sufficient in the context.239 
Having posited that Boumediene entirely circumvents the entry fiction 
doctrine and provides a constitutional basis for extending due process 
protections to asylum seekers, the following discussion focuses on how the 
constitutional guarantees of due process can be extended without 
undermining the Executive’s plenary power over immigration matters.  By 
balancing the government and private interests at stake and evaluating the 
fairness and reliability of existing procedures, the next section of this Note 
addresses whether the prolonged detention of nonresident arriving aliens—
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both asylum seekers and applicants for admission subject to expedited 
removal—raises serious constitutional threats and how they may be 
remedied. 
B.  Ascertaining the Content of Due Process 
Whether the prolonged detention of nonresident arriving aliens raises 
constitutional concerns and warrants judicial interference with 
congressionally prescribed procedures depends on whether the procedures 
governing detention comport with due process.240  Since the notion of due 
process is inherently flexible, the nature of procedural protections required 
varies with the demands of a particular situation and is determined by 
balancing the interests at stake.241 
As a preliminary matter, the procedures prescribed for examination and 
detention of nonresident arriving aliens subject to an order of expedited 
removal are constitutionally sufficient because balancing the interests 
involved yields a result analogous to Demore v. Kim.242  The determination 
of whether an arriving alien possesses valid and requisite documentation is 
made by executive officers at the ports of entry in accordance with 
established guidelines and regulations.243  The availability of judicial review 
via habeas proceedings to challenge these threshold determinations, as 
prescribed by Congress, makes it unlikely that any additional procedures 
would yield much value.244  At the examination stage, the private interest at 
stake is the right to enter the United States.  However, no alien has a right of 
admission into the United States as it is a privilege and not an entitlement.245  
Moreover, the public interest in expediting the examination of applicants for 
admission who fall under the purview of § 1225(b)(1) is significant given the 
need to protect the nation’s borders.246 
Detention of aliens subject to an order of expedited removal certainly 
implicates their liberty interest,247 which on its face seems particularly 
significant.  However, when reviewed in the context of the purpose of 
detention it becomes significantly diminished.  The government has a 
compelling interest in minimizing the risk of flight for aliens not entitled to 
admission into the United States so that removal may be carried out.248  
Hence, detention bears a reasonable relation to its purpose as the risk of flight 
for aliens who have failed the credible-fear screening is considerably greater 
compared to aliens who have passed the credible-fear screening and have 
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strong defenses against removal.249  Moreover, the provision of discretionary 
parole accounts for extenuating circumstances where detention may be 
unreasonable, and it renders superfluous the need for additional procedural 
protections for arriving aliens subject to expedited removal.250  As the 
procedures prescribed by Congress with respect to the detention of aliens 
subject to expedited removal are constitutionally sufficient, they do not raise 
any serious constitutional concerns that would warrant the need for judicial 
interference. 
With respect to nonresident arriving aliens seeking asylum, however, the 
calculus changes significantly as the interests implicated are qualitatively 
different.  As a procedural matter, because aliens in this category would have 
already passed the credible-fear screening,251 the following discussion 
focuses on their detention during the pendency of removal proceedings and 
whether the procedural protections afforded in detention are constitutionally 
sufficient.  This Note posits that the statutorily prescribed procedure is 
insufficient in light of the interests at stake and emphasizes how adopting a 
discrete remedy—bond hearings after a reasonable period of detention—
could yield a constitutionally sufficient process.252 
By virtue of their status, asylum seekers lack sufficient connections with 
the United States to be considered a part of the national community.  But as 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist intimated in Verdugo-Urquidez, protections 
of the Fifth Amendment—and concomitantly the Due Process Clause—do 
not turn on whether or not an individual is part of the national community.253  
Moreover, although asylum seekers have only a tenuous relationship to the 
national polity, their personal interest at stake—not being returned to a 
country where they might face torture, imprisonment, or death—is of the 
“highest possible” magnitude.254  Given that they have already cleared the 
initial credible-fear screening, their private interests are more than a mere 
frivolity.255  Unarguably, the government has a strong interest in ensuring 
that these asylum seekers appear at their scheduled removal proceedings.256  
However, this interest is tempered by the fact that these asylum seekers have 
already passed the credible-fear screening and hence have little incentive to 
flee and abandon a substantial defense to removal.257 
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Furthermore, although detention in this instance has an obvious 
termination point—the conclusion of removal proceedings—the length of 
this period is uncertain and often runs into months or even years, unlike the 
five-month detention the Demore v. Kim Court found to be reasonable.258  
Since balancing the interests at stake with respect to the detention of asylum 
seekers yields a result sufficiently analogous to Zadvydas, due process 
requires that procedural protections be afforded to ensure that detention 
continues to bear a reasonable relation to its purpose.259 
Providing an opportunity for individual custody determinations before an 
immigration judge after a presumptively reasonable period of time has 
elapsed would alleviate the concerns outlined above without undermining the 
Executive’s plenary power.  Affording the opportunity for a bond hearing 
would not entitle aliens to be admitted into the United States.260  Requiring 
the government to produce the asylum seekers before an immigration judge 
and to articulate the precise basis for their continuing detention would merely 
ensure that detention continues to bear a reasonable relation to its purpose.  
The standards and requirements for admitting aliens into the United States 
would continue to be governed by Congress and the Executive, preserving 
their plenary power over immigration matters.261  Moreover, continued 
detention would remain justified and proper if the government can show that 
a particular alien poses a danger to the community or a high risk of flight.262 
However, if the alien can show that neither justification is warranted, he 
or she should be released subject to appropriate conditions and restrictions.  
Moreover, the opportunity for review before an impartial decision maker is 
likely to improve the accuracy of the parole process by not only curing any 
erroneous deprivations of liberty but also encouraging executive officials to 
be more conscientious in rendering their initial determinations.263 
Hence, the constitutional threats raised by the prolonged detention of 
asylum seekers can be alleviated by affording the detained asylum seekers 
the opportunity to challenge the basis of their detention, after a reasonable 
period of detention, without undermining the Executive’s plenary power. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Executive possesses plenary power over the substantive 
criteria governing admission of aliens into the United States, the procedures 
employed to enforce these decisions must remain subject to judicial scrutiny.  
Given the inherent vulnerabilities plaguing asylum seekers detained pursuant 
to § 1225(b), it is crucial that courts reevaluate the utility of the entry fiction 
doctrine.  Judicial recalcitrance to address the constitutional entitlements of 
nonresident arriving aliens seeking asylum and strict adherence to old and 
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presumably antiquated precedent not only puts these aliens in serious 
jeopardy by grossly undervaluing their liberty interest but also stands in stark 
contrast to recent jurisprudence. 
Although Clark v. Martinez-inspired approaches might yield temporary 
relief for this vulnerable group, they remain susceptible to Executive 
override.  Using the pragmatic functionalism of Boumediene to extend the 
reach of the Due Process Clause will ameliorate the harm wrought by the 
entry fiction doctrine without impeding the control of the Executive over 
immigration policy and enforcement.  Given the inherently amorphous nature 
of the Due Process Clause, there is no real danger that extending it to afford 
procedural protections to asylum seekers, which are comparable to those 
afforded to other aliens in removal proceedings, will compromise or 
overwhelm the government’s interests. 
